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RESIDUALS-ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICY ANALYSISt
DANIEL P. LOUCKStt
For a considerable time, economists, ecologists, engineers, politicians, and even the members of the silent majority who think
seriously about such things as the quality of our environment have
recognized that the external diseconomies caused by the discharge of
wastes or residuals into our environment cannot be efficiently reduced or managed by considering the various environmental mediaair, land and water-separately. They also realized that many environmental quality management alternatives are overlooked by accepting
as fixed the quantities and sources of residuals that are released into
our environment.
In spite of the rather widespread recognition of the strong interrelationships between the production and consumption of goods and
services, residuals production, modification, treatment and disposal,
and the quality of our air, land and water, only relatively recently
have attempts been made to develop management techniques for
defining and evaluating the effects on environmental quality of
various residuals management policies. Except in a very general
framework, relatively few have examined the environmental consequences of changing the manner and amounts of goods and services
produced and consumed, the type and quantity of residuals treatment and modification, and the receptor protection measures that
can be implemented for the purpose of reducing residual damages.
Some beginnings have been made toward structuring comprehensive environmental quality models for use as tools in defining and
evaluating specific residuals management policy alternatives.'
Progress to date provides only a framework. Nevertheless, it is a
beginning and there is reason to believe that eventually some very
useful tools will be available for assisting in the formulation of improved environmental quality programs and policies. It must be emtAn earlier draft of this article was prepared for presentation at a conference sponsored
by Resources for the Future on Environmental Quality: Research Studies in the Social
Sciences. Drs. Russell and Spofford, who have developed a much more detailed residuals
management model, and Blair Bower were extremely helpful during the preparation of this
paper.
ttAssociate Professor of Environmental Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, New
York.
1. Russell and Spofford, A Quantitative Framework for Residuals-Environmental
Quality Management, Natural Resource Systems Models in Decision Making 66 (1970).
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phasized, however, that there are many difficulties and problems to
overcome before such models become truly comprehensive tools for
public policy decisions.
Our environmental quality is intimately related to our standard of
living. It has been suggested that if we are really serious about improving the quality of our environment we must learn to produce
and consume fewer goods and services such as cars, non-returnable
containers, television sets, electric can openers, and even people! It
involves much more than spending a few extra dollars for quieter
cars, jets and air conditioners, more efficient waste treatment facilities, and larger land disposal sites.
Any significant improvement in our environmental quality will
require some social and political adjustments. It would seem that
these non-economic as well as economic adjustment costs (if they
can be separated) must be considered in any analysis of residuals
management policies if in fact comprehensive residuals management
analyses are to provide useful information for policy decisions. The
ultimate resolution of such public policy issues as environmental
quality may well rest as much, if not more, on political feasibility
arguments as on rational economic debate.
In addition to the problems of defining political and economic
feasibility, let alone optimality, there are numerous informational
limitations that currently restrict the formulation of truly comprehensive environmental quality management models. We know relatively little, for example, about the transmission of noise in an urban
area, or about the ecological change that results, if any, from various
industrial chemicals released into our rivers and lakes. We have been
relatively unsuccessful in quantifying in any politically meaningful
way just what the benefits or losses are associated with certain environmental quality parameters. Yet it is these and other economic,
political and informational limitations that motivate many to structure both partial and comprehensive environmental quality models.
Through such models analyses have been performed to obtain some
estimate of the kinds of information and assumptions that are the
most important and essential to the process of reaching desirable
public policy decisions. Obviously as these models are further improved they will provide increasingly useful information to the decision making process.
A CONCEPTUAL ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MODEL
In order to have some basis for discussing environmental quality
models and their contribution to public policy decisions, a very general and conceptual model will be structured. Only the functional
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form of many of the economic and technologic functions will be
presented. The specific forms of many of these functions, in so far as
we know anything about them, are described in the appropriate current literature. 2
The conceptual environmental quality model that follows represents a static, partial equilibrium analysis. Not every activity of the
region whose quality is of concern is included in the model. We
assume that we know or can obtain everything we would like to have
in the way of production functions and benefit, cost and damage
functions. Explicit in the model is the existence of a politically viable
institutional or governmental body responsible, and having the
authority for the management of environmental quality. This body
can apply both legal and economic measures for the purpose of
improving environmental quality. It can set effluent standards and it
can tax or subsidize, as necessary, to finance construction grants
programs for facilities that modify residuals and/or the assimilative
capacity of the environment (e.g. through flow augmentation and
in-stream aeration). Finally, this environmental quality authority
must pay its own administrative costs and at the same time insure
that no individual's net welfare is reduced because of its environmental quality management program.
Even though some of these assumptions will be modified later, it is
sometimes instructive to play "what if" games such as this. A knowledge of the kinds of information and institutional relationships that
might be needed to achieve both a better standard of living and a
better quality of our environment, together with estimates of what
that standard and quality might be, could well provide powerful
incentives for changing the way things are done today. At least it can
point out where additional data and research are required and what
institutional changes might be considered. Later we must discuss how
this model and similar analyses can be made more effective in assisting the political process, but for now let us proceed with the basic
framework of this residuals management model.
Figure 1 illustrates in a very general way, the system in which
environmental (natural), human and material resources are transformed, through production and consumption processes, into goods
and services, material by-products, and wastes or residuals. The residuals are usually released into our environment, either before or after
some modification or treatment. They then may be partially
assimilated and modified by natural or artificial processes within the
2. See, e.g., A. Kneese and B. Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology,
and Institutions 164 (1968); R. Dorfman, H. Jacoby, H. Thomas, et al., Models for Managing Regional Water Quality, forthcoming.
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Residuals -Environmental Quality System

environment. Those of us living in the waste receiving environment
may be affected by these residuals. The extent to which we are
adversely affected depends on our location, experience, physical and
mental health, education and numerous other factors. In some cases
there exist protective measures that we can use to reduce these adverse effects.
Society's demand for an increased standard of living is the driving
force behind the production and consumption of goods and services.
Because both air and water (and occasionally land) have been free
goods, the release of residuals into these media has reduced the cost
of producing certain goods and services, often to the benefit of both
the producer and consumer. Yet those whose environmental quality
is decreased because of the production of these residuals may experience a loss in welfare. If there exists an institutional means
whereby those experiencing an increase in welfare can allocate part
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of that increase to those whose welfare has been reduced, then it is
possible to define, in the Pareto sense, an optimum environmental
quality.
Referring to Figure 1, we describe X as the vector of all the goods
and services produced from the vector of factor inputs F, i.e., the
natural, material and human resources used in production and consumption. Each vector of goods and services can be produced by a
variety of alternative processes k. Each production alternative has
associated with it a cost Ck (FkJk,Xk). This cost depends on the
scale of the production processes Pk, on the production inputs Fk,
and on the vector of goods and services Xkproduced by that kth
alternative. The production of X by processes P using input factors
results in a vector of residuals, R=R(F,P,X). An essential part of the
comprehensive residuals management problem involves the selection
of the input factors F, the goods and services R and the production
processes P which in part determine the vector of residuals produced,

r

In order to decrease the damages that could result from the production of the residuals R, there exist various means for 1) modifying the residuals at their sources (i.e. within the production and
consumption sector); 2) modifying the residuals released from the
production and consumption sector in collective (regional or
municipal) modification or treatment facilities; 3) increasing the
assimilative capacity of the environment; and 4) protecting the individual from these partially treated and assimilated residuals that he
experiences in his environment. Each alternative may require natural,
human and material resources, F, and in turn may generate its own
residuals.
The modification of residuals, through by-product production,
materials recovery and reclamation, if any, within the production
and consumption sector we can denote as part of the processes P.
The scale of each collective modification process alternative j we will
denote as Tj, costing Cj(FjTj,j), where for each process alternative
j, Fj is that portion of resources used and Rj is that portion of the
generated residuals R modified. The output from collective modification facilities is another vector of modified residuals RM that is a
function of the original vector of residuals A and those added residuals that are produced by the modification processes themselves.
Thus RM=RM(F,R,T).
Next we must describe the change in each component of the residuals vector RM as it is affected by the environment. The degree of
residuals modification or assimilation, if any, between each residual
source or collective modification facility and each individual or
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receptor is a function of numerous environmental factors, E. In addition, there may also be numerous artificial methods R, of scale M
and requiring resources F, to increase the natural environmental
residuals assimilative capacity. These artificial methods cost
C(FQ,M,E,RM). The application of artificial means M together with
the natural assimilative capacity E results in a modified residuals or
quality vector Q=Q(F,RM,E,M). Again Q includes those residuals
that may have been produced by the methods R used for artificially
increasing the environmental assimilative capacity. Combining some
of the above relationships we can write a general production function
for predicting the vector of residuals or quality Q at all receptor
sites: Q=Q(RM(f,R(PPX),T)TEA), or simply Q=Q(F,PX,T,E,M).
At each receptor site there may exist various protective devices
that reduce the damages caused by the remaining residuals Q. We will
assume here that each individual, or groups of individuals, i, will
employ protective devices (e.g. ear plugs or water treatment plants)
only to the extent that they minimize the sum of the damages incurred by the remaining residuals and the cost of the protection. This
minimum sum will be termed net damages NDi(Q). This net damage
function may be positive, indicating a loss in individual welfare, or
negative, indicating a gain in welfare. (Some individuals may enjoy
increased benefits from a particular residuals vector Q in the environment, e.g., heat discharge which improves fishing.)
Before proceeding to the construction of a model of this residualenvironmental quality system we need to make some assumptions
about how the system might be managed. Let us assume, for the
purpose of illustration, that the net damages NDi(Q) can be
measured in monetary terms and that the regional environmental
quality agency has the power to charge or subsidize each individual,
or group of individuals, based on the residuals they produce in order
to maintain some desired or optimal level of environmental quality.
The purpose of the model will be to estimate just what that optimal
quality level might be, i.e., the level that maximizes total net welfare,
and how it might be achieved.
For each individual or group i, within the region of interest, let
Bi(R) be his gross benefit associated with the vector of goods and
services X produced and consumed, Ci(X) his cost, Gi(Ri,kMi) his
effluent charge (Gi>O) or subsidy (Gi,0) based on his residuals ]Ii
and KMi, and NDi(Q) his loss or damage resulting from a vector of
environmental residuals 0. Given this notation we can write the total
net welfare objective as follows:
Maximize

1 [Bi(X)
1

-

Ci(X)

-

Gi(Ri, RMi)

-

NDi()](

(1-0)
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This objective must be constrained in a number of ways. We need
to define the technological relationships between the environmental
factors, E, the various decision variables, IP,,,T and M, and the
level of resulting residuals Q. As was previously defined, this relationship, in functional form, is simply

Q=Q(F,P,X,T,B,

)

(1.1)

Any new environmental quality program should insure that each
individual's net benefit NBi(X,R,RM,Q), after the implementation of
the environmental quality management program, shaltbe no less than
what it was before the implementation or change, NBi. Thus for each
individual i:
NBi(X,R,M,Q) = Bi(X) - Ci(X) - Gi(ki,RMi) - NDi(Q) > NB10

(1.2)

Any new environmental quality program should also be self sustaining. We can insure this by having the total cost of all residuals
modification T and environmental residuals modification programs
M, plus the cost of program administration, Cg(kkMQ), be no
greater than the net charges collected.
I Gi(ki,kMi)
Cg(R,kM,Q) + Y Cj(Fj,Tj,Rj) + i CQ(FQ,MQ,E,RM)
i
V
(1.3)
In addition it is reasonable to assume that the total cost of producing
any vector of goods and services R will equal the amount paid for
them by all individuals.
Ck(FkPk,Xk) = 2 Ci(X)

(1.4)

i
This completes our general and conceptual model. If the assumptions on which it is based are valid, and if satisfactory production,
cost benefit and damage functions could be defined, the program
suggested by the solution of this model would provide a possible
framework for recommending changes in our present environmental
quality policies. The two set of curves in Figure 2 illustrate what
might happen if such a program were implemented for a system
consisting of only two individuals holding X and R constant at R0
and R°. The upper set of curves are the net welfare functions of the
two individuals as only Q varies from what now exists, namely Q°.
Without any transfer of benefits from individual 1 to individual 2,
the goods and services produced and consumed, X, the residuals
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Net Welfare Before And After A Residuals-Environmental Quality Program

produced, R and the resulting environmental quality Q equal

o,

o

and Q° respectively. Assume that this situation exists before the
establishment of any environmental quality control program.
The highest and lowest set of curves are identical to the respective
upper set of curves shifted vertically so that they intersect the
The ordinate of the lower set of curves now represents
abscissa at Qo.

the net change in welfare given a change in Q from Q° holding X°

and R0 constant. The establishment of an environmental quality
authority would have the effect of keeping the net welfare of indialong the abscissa, through
at )o, namely
vidual 2 the same as it wasindividual
2 and increasing the net welfare
the use of subsidy G2 to
Q. difference becharge G The
of individual 1 through an effluent
effluent subsidy G2 is the cost
tween the effluent charge G and the
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of program administration, collective residuals modification and
environmental modification as specified by constraint (1.3). In this
case the environmental quality increases from Q' to Q* for a net gain
in total welfare and no loss in either individual's welfare. However, if
in addition to economic incentives in the form of effluent charges,
legal constraints in the form of effluent or quality standards were
imposed restricting the range of P,T or M, there may be some loss in
individual welfare.
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES FOR SOLUTION
Present knowledge prevents us from specifying in detail many of
the functions assumed by this conceptual model and solving it in its
present form. There are two main reasons for this: computational
and informational. In addition to these two problems, there is a
third, involving implementation of policy. This is the problem of
political feasibility. Let us briefly examine these three problems,
using the model just structured as a means of illustration.
A. ComputationalProblems
One of the main features illustrated by the above conceptual
model is the nonlinear aspect of this residuals management problem.
The state-of-the-art in mathematical programming methods for solving large nonlinear optimization problems is such that those of us
who are interested in structuring models that can be solved relatively
efficiently by other than highly skilled mathematical and computer
programmers, and in having solutions that will include a detailed
analysis of the sensitivity of the solution to changes in important
variables and parameters, usually resort to either linear or dynamic
programming whenever possible. For the residuals management problem the multiplicity of state variables, i.e., each good or service produced and consumed and each residual modified, suggests a
dimensionality problem that would almost always preclude solution
by dynamic programming. Thus we are often limited, in a practical
sense, to algorithms for solving linear programming problems. However, as anyone who has struggled with large linear programming
problems knows, what is advertised and what is possible are often
several orders of magnitude apart. Because of the nonlinear nature of
many residuals management models some assumptions and mathematical tricks are required in order to adapt them to solution by
linear programming techniques.
Referring to the conceptual model presented above, a main source
of nonlinearity stems from including as unknowns or decision variables both the residuals R resulting from the production and con-
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sumption of goods and services and the amount of residuals treatment and environmental modification. In other words the
production function for environmental quality QQ(F,P,X,T,E,M) is
nonlinear in R and T and M. Some of this nonlinearity can be
eliminated by dividing the model in two parts, namely an interindustry model and an environmental model and solving each part
separately.' In the environmental quality model the variables F,P,X
and R are held constant. The objective of the environmental quality
model is to find the particular values of T and M that minimize the
total net loss associated with the quality of the environment Q, as
affected by residuals discharge, i.e.
Minimize

Y [NDi(Q) + Gi(Ri,RMi)]
i

The interindustry portion of this conceptual model would have as
its objective the maximization of benefits Bi(X) less the costs Ci(X)
of goods and services and the costs Gi(Ki,iMi) of maintaining environmental quality 0.
Maximize

I [Bi(X) - Ci(X) - Gi(Ri,RMi)]

i
The residuals modification T and environmental modification M variables are held constant, as determined from the environmental quality model.
The constraints of both models would include those previously
discussed. Once the interindustry model is solved, the variables F,X,P
and R, can then be fixed and the environmental quality model solved
again to obtain new estimates of the environmental quality.
There are, of course, some additional nonlinearities inherent in
residuals management models. Some result from the inclusion of
alternatives for environmental modification. Flow augmentation for
improved water quality, for example, involves an extremely nonlinear set of production function constraints. In relatively simple
cases an approximation technique may suffice, depending on the
accuracy of other parameters and functions in the model. Artificial
in-stream aeration is another alternative to environmental modification, which, in this case, results in a nonlinear objective function.
Most residuals modification processes-materials recovery by-product
production, treatment-involve economies of scale. Further, most
treatment processes remove varying amounts of different residuals
3. See, e.g., supra note 1.
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components and produce varying amounts of different residuals,
depending on the efficiency of the processes themselves. Examples
include the simultaneous removal of carbonaceous BOD, nitrogenous
BOD and suspended sediment, and the production of sludge as well
as wastewater effluent. These "joint product" effects often preclude
the usefulness of techniques for linearizing segments of convex cost
and damage functions or concave benefit functions for inclusion in
linear programming models.
Finally, two more computational problems should be mentioned.
The first is the stochastic nature of the residuals released into the
environment as well as the stochastic nature of the assimilative
capacity of our environment. Explicit consideration of these variabilities will no doubt considerably increase the size of these already
large models. The second problem is, in fact, the size of any realistic
residuals management model, even if it were deterministic, i.e. did
not explicitly consider the stochastic elements. Even if we had all the
information we desired, the most simple comprehensive environmental quality models, such as those developed in this paper, tax
both the analytical and computational abilities of our present day
solution algorithms and digital computer software systems.
B. InformationalProblems
One of the characteristics of a systems analysis approach to problem solving is the requirement for being very explicit about the
assumptions being made and the functions being used to predict
quality, benefits, costs and damages. There is much we still have to
learn about our residuals environmental quality system. We have
problems even measuring environmental quality as well as in the
quantification of resulting damages, if any. At present our knowledge
of production functions, relating the input of resources to the production and consumption of goods and services and to the generation
of residuals, is indeed meager. We know very little about the time
and spatial pattern of residuals concentrations in the environment.
The capacity of the environment to transmit, diffuse and assimilate
residuals is not constant over time, yet a knowledge of the residuals
concentration over time as well as space has important implications
for decision making processes. 4 Further, we know very little about
many of the interactions that may take place among different
residuals released into the environment and between those residuals
and the environmental media and those organisms living in it. Even if
it were possible to determine the distribution, in time as well as in
4. See J. Carlson, How much environmental quality should we buy?, 6 Industrial Water
Engineering 20 (1969).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

space, of environmental quality resulting from a specified temporal
and spacial pattern of residuals discharge, the resulting short and long
run damages have not been quantified even for a single residual, let
alone for multiple residuals.
Measuring the social benefits or the willingness to pay for certain
vectors of goods and services is also difficult if not practically impossible in some cases. Yet the conceptual model presented above
requires most of this knowledge if it is to yield meaningful information.
Probably one of the most troublesome informational and conceptual problems, that is often governed by computational limitations, is what to include within the model. If it is a region that is to
be managed for environmental quality, how big should the region be;
how many political districts and activities should be included within
the residuals management system and which variables should be considered exogenous or outside of the system? The answers to these
questions are not always easily obtained. They will largely depend on
what is, or what may be, politically feasible for an environmental
quality management agency to do. The importance of this aspect of
systems analysis for deriving useful public policy information brings
us to the third problem stated above, namely implementation. This
warrants a few additional comments on the application of residuals
management models in a political environment, the quality of which
may vary considerably!
RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY
There is considerable debate today, in and out of government,
over the extent to which we should use our environment to
assimilate various residuals. Since our environment is essentially a
common property resource,' its quality is and will continue to be
largely a matter of public policy and of public or collective choice.
To be useful, residuals management (and other) models for public
policy decisions require a recognition of political constraints,
political objectives, and-if you will-political opportunity costs, as
well as the economic, ecological and technological ones. A sense of
political feasibility and when and how to extend this feasibility is an
essential attribute of successful public policy analysts.
If residuals management models are to be successful in influencing
decisions they must fit into the political process and at the same time
5. See the discussion of this concept in A. V. Kneese and R. C. d'Arge, Pervasive External
Costs and the Response of Society, The Analysis and Evaluation of PublicExpenditures:
The PPB System, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91 Cong., 1 Sess., 1969.
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help to modify that process. While the range of alternatives must be
chosen with a full knowledge of the political constraints and sensitivities, it is both the analyst's as well as the decision maker's job to try
to extend what is politically possible and to recognize, identify and
discuss publicly the issues involved. 6
In addition to the political constraints, an awareness of the
political objectives is just as important for successful public policy
modeling. The conceptual residuals management model presented
above assumes, initially, that efficiency is the sole objective. This
objective can be expanded to include the political differences between various groups of individuals. Each group i would include
those individuals who affect the residuals-environmental quality
system in similar ways and who have similar political and economic
objectives. Each group's total political influence relative to the other
groups might be defined by a weight Pi that is included in the objective function, i.e.
Maximize

2 Pi NBi(X,R,RM,Q)

i
Similarly, if benefit and damage functions are lacking, we can use
in the objective function the parameters themselves that result in
benefits and damages. In this case the political weights would reflect
the relative importance of various parameter levels (identified as
issues or goals) i.e. how strongly each group considers and can influence the outcome of each issue or goal.
Clearly the value of these weights can only be known after the
decision is made, but by assuming a variety of relative weights,
thereby defining a variety of possible residual management alternatives, the analyst can provide the decision making process with an
estimate of not only what can be done, i.e., what is politically admissible, but also the implications of each alternative on each group
or goal. Such information should assist in improving, at least incrementally, public policies. The analyst cannot and should not make
the decisions, or even think that he can by assuming only a single
vector of relative weights associated with multiple groups or goals.
The definition of our priorities remains a question to be answered by
the political process. Thus, at least for those analysts interested in
public policy problems, it would seem that this approach cannot
actually solve any particular problem, it can only suggest possible
"politically effective alternatives." Those alternatives that are con6. See, e.g., R. Davis, The Range of Choice in Water Management: A Study of Dissolved
Oxygen in the Potomac Estuary (1968).
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sidered better than others will usually be those that politicians think
they can sell. Politicians often search not only for efficiency or
effectiveness but for a politically saleable product.
Public policy models are effective only in so far as they can help
the decision makers evaluate various program modifications in terms
of the tradeoffs between political saleability and program effectiveness in an economic sense. Of course either extreme may be undesirable and can decrease the potential of analyses such as those
discussed above. If we always confine ourselves to those objectives
defined by conventional political wisdom, or if we ignore this
wisdom altogether, little progress can be expected.
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Analytical residuals management models, if properly structured,
can assist our intuition and judgment in sorting out the effects of
complex issues and objectives. These models can often say something
about whether specified objectives can be achieved and if so how
they must be achieved, but they can say very little about whether
they are good or bad objectives. We never really "know" even our
own individual objectives let alone public policy objectives. This is
why decision makers spend much of their time arguing about little
else. It is toward the identification of the more important and relevant objectives and issues and toward the elimination of those which
have little effect either politically or economically, that public policy
models can be of real value.
Public policy problems are too complex and influenced by too
many seemingly non-rational political considerations to hope that
even the most sophisticated set of analytical techniques would be
capable of determining the optimum solution. Optimization is
achieved only with relation to a particular set of technical, economic,
legal and political assumptions, i.e., with respect to a particular
model. This point merits emphasis. Failure to understand this meaning of the word optimization has led to many misunderstandings
between systems analysts and decision makers. The most we can
expect from residuals management and other models is a means of
defining and evaluating alternative solutions based on various sets of
assumptions. When an analyst can begin to get the decision maker to
question the assumptions in his models rather than merely accepting
or rejecting a particular solution, he has begun the sequential process
of trial and error-of communication with feedback-so absolutely
necessary for the successful application and implementation of
analyses to residuals management and similar public policy questions.

